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Although auctions have been an important model for 
price discovery on Internet, economics does not have a 
precise theory of auctions. Auctions raise many problems 
such as what types of goods will be sold by auction on 
Internet, and how bidders bid on Internet auction. It is 
curious why some newly manufactured products that are 
sold on the posted-price markets are also sold by auction 
on Internet. This paper presents a field study on Internet 
to investigate the differences between the bidding 
behavior for secondhand and newly manufactured goods. 
Data is collected on an open-book auction site. The 
results show that there were really some bidders behaved 
like evaluators and whether a bidder will be an evaluator 
or a participator is not affected by common referenced 
external market price. Furthermore, the prices on 
posted-price market may affect bids on the auction 
market., averaged normalized mark up of newly 
manufactured items were significantly larger than that of 
secondhand items. Implications of the findings are also 
discussed in this paper. 
 
1. Introduction 
The Internet is shaping industries and changing 
business models. Internet can facilitate transactions 
between buyer and seller and lower the transaction cost. 
Some literatures suggested that Internet will cause the 
disintermediation effects and network services will 
replace traditional middlemen in the value chain [14] [16]. 
The issue of disintermediation has raised the debates on 
whether electronic marketplace can perform the functions 
of traditional middleman [1].  
One major function of intermediaries is to gather, 
organize, and evaluate information, which is dispersed in 
society, and to set the price based on this information to 
clean the market [18] [20]. It is a hard work for the firms 
to get sufficient information to make the pricing decision. 
So usually either the quantity of demand is less than the 
quantity of supply and the product has to be sold at a 
discount, or the posted price is too low and there will be a 
rush for the product or the buyers have to pay a premium. 
Because it is not easy to clean the market on the posted 
price, traditionally, except for the transactions of some 
standardized commodities in retail market, most of the 
final dealing prices are decided by dickering or 
bargaining. The price marked in the store or printed in 
the catalog is just the asking price of the seller. This 
asking price is usually higher than the price the seller can 
accept. Sellers and buyers will try to gather information 
and reveal the other’s bottom line during the bargaining 
process.  
For the posted price is usually not efficient enough, it 
is an interesting problem how the price is decided for 
products sold on Internet. Lower menu cost is one major 
benefit of electronic commerce [19]. Modahl [13] has 
suggested that the dynamic pricing model, which can 
change the price simultaneously according to current 
sales, is the most important innovative feature of 
electronic commerce. On the other hand, some 
bargaining agents, which is an software agent on the 
Internet and can take the place of seller or buyer in the 
bargaining processes, have been proposed [8]. However, 
although there have been so many solutions for price 
discovery, auction is still the seldom one which has 
worked in practice. Electronic auction solve the problem 
of getting the buyers or sellers to reveal their best price. 
Companies such as eBay, Ubid, Priceline, and 
FreeMarkets have invented various auction models in 
different markets and worked well. For example, eBay, 
which provides a platform for English auction for 
individual sellers and buyers, has supposed to be one of 
the most successful companies on Internet.  
Although auctions have been an important model on 
Internet, economics does not have a precise theory of 
auctions [4]. Firms face the new type of transaction need 
to learning how to adopt the new mechanism in the 
organizations as sellers or buyers [3] [5]. Because 
Internet provides a different context for auction, bidding 
behaviors on Internet may be different from other auction 
markets. Internet auctions raise a variety of interesting 
questions for economists to investigate such as what 
types of goods will be sold by auction, and how bidders 
bid on Internet auction. It is curious why some newly 
manufactured products that are sold on the posted-price 
markets are also sold by auction on Internet. This paper 
will present a field study on Internet that investigated the 
differences between the bidding behavior for secondhand 
and newly manufactured goods. Results of this study may 
help to find out how bidders bid on the Internet and 




2. Auctions on the Internet 
Auctions are processes of formalized dickering. There 
have been many different auction mechanisms like the 
English ascending-bid auctions, the Dutch 
descending-bid auctions, the first-price sealed-bid 
auctions, the Vickrey second-price sealed-bid auctions 
and double auctions [12]. Auction could be an effective 
way for price discovery if the number of participants is 
large enough. However, the cost of gathering enough 
participants at the same time is high, so in the past, 
auctions are seldom used in consumer markets except for 
some expensive collectables. 
Electronic auction solve the problem of getting the 
players at the same time to reveal their best price. 
Auction evolved in a setting where people could hear and 
see each other. Traditionally, people participate in an 
English or Dutch auction have to stay and pay attention 
to the process during the bidding period. But Internet has 
provided a different context. The network can get people 
in different locations participate the auction easily. 
Besides, in order to get more participants, auctions on the 
Internet are usually asynchronous that the auction 
information is exchanged on the network and the bidding 
period continues for a few days. The basic challenge for 
Internet auction is that bidders in an auction lasting for 
several days have to stay on line to raise their bids. Proxy 
bidding solves this problem by providing a software 
agent. When current price is below the upper limit price 
specified by the bidder, the agent will bid automatically 
on the price mark up by the minimum increment set by 
the seller [4]. So people don’t have to stay on line and 
can bid on any convenient time during the auction period. 
Asynchronous auctions have lowered buyers’ cost to 
participate.  
Lee [7] analyzes prices in electronic and conventional 
auction markets for used cars sold from 1986 to 1995. He 
found that prices in the electronic markets were higher 
than prices in the conventional markets and that this price 
difference seems to increase over time. This result has 
showed that the electronic markets have been more 
efficient than conventional markets for auctions.  
2.1 Types of goods 
As Internet technology lowers the cost of running an 
auction relative to using other pricing mechanisms, it is 
expected that new types of goods will be auctioned. 
However, the literature has not yet examined the question 
of what types of goods sellers would prefer to auction 
[11]. Wang [21] compares posted-price selling with 
auctions and finds that without auction costs, auctions are 
always optimal, and as long as there is a wide dispersion 
of buyer valuation, auctions will still outperform 
posted-price selling even if auctions were costly [6]. 
Similarly, Hall [4] argues auctions are favored when 
there is a lot of uncertainty about the market value of the 
objects. The value has to be high enough to make the 
auction process worthwhile, and the players need to have 
enough time to make the auction work.  
For Internet technology lowers the costs of running an 
auction, Lucking-Reiley [11] suggests as the market 
develops out of its infancy, we might well expect to see 
more additions to the list of auctioned. On the other 
hands, Liebowitx [9] emphasizes auctions are a step 
backward in the evolution of retailing and only make 
sense for odd lots, surplus, one-of-a-kind items, or items 
for which the audience likes the thrill of the chase. 
Meanwhile, Lucking-Reiley [11] suggests that auctions 
will be used most often for goods in limited supply where 
the demand is unknown to the seller, because these are 
the circumstances under which the benefits of a flexible, 
market-determined price are likely to be greatest. 
Lucking-Reiley [11] also notices that auctions would 
seem to provide relatively little social benefit in the case 
of newly manufactured items, because the supply of such 
items is not fixed, so the retailer can adjust prices or 
quantities in response to observed demand. By contrast, 
used and rare items are in relatively fixed supply, so 
auctions can be valuable in determining the correct price 
and allocation in the face of uncertain demand.  
However, many auction sites do sell newly 
manufactured items. Lucking-Reiley [11] notes that there 
have been two primary business models for Internet 
auctions: merchant sites and listing-agent sites. A 
merchant site offers its own merchandise for sale, acting 
as a retailer who happens to conduct its transactions 
through auction. A listing site acts as an agent for other 
sellers, allowing them to register their items and running 
the auctions on their behalf. Some auction sites combine 
both types of models. Many Products sold on the 
merchant sites are newly manufactured ones.  
2.2 Bidding behavior 
Why these newly manufactured products are sold by 
auction is an interesting question because these products 
are sold on posted-price in the past. It seems that the cost 
to adjust prices or quantities on posted-price markets is 
higher than the cost of auctions markets on Internet. 
However, efficiencies of auction markets are affected by 
numbers and strategies of bidders. Bapna et al. [2] studies 
bidders’ strategies in multi-item online auction and the 
result of the data mining shows there are three types of 
bidders: evaluators, participators, and opportunists. 
Evaluators are those who know clearly their true 
valuation of the good and submit high bids at the early 
stages of the auction. Participators are bidders who 
follow the bidding closely and place ascending bids. 
Opportunists are driven by thoughts of getting bargains – 
they usually place the lowest possible bids toward the 
end of an auction. Because there are list prices for the 
newly manufactured products, which are also sold on 
posted-price market, if the posted prices are efficient 
enough, these prices will be the common value of the 
products. There will be more bidders who know the 




However, Hall [4] has told another story. He argues 
that auction theory is based on the idea that the players 
all have cutoff prices in mind before the auction begins. 
If all bidders are eventually going to enter bids with their 
true maximums, it just does not matter, whether you bid 
at the beginning, middle, or end of the auction, or when 
others bid, has no effect on the outcome. The winner is 
always the player with the highest cutoff price, and the 
price is always the runner-up maximum plus the bid 
increment.  
In fact, there is lot evidence that people learn auctions 
and adjust their ideas about the value of what is for sale. 
Bidders learn about the value of the goods by seeing the 
bids of others. They don’t know their cutoff values before 
an auction begin [12]. Rather than having a good idea of 
the maximum they are willing to pay, they have a general 
idea that they want an object, and a firm desire not to pay 
more than it is worth. They would like to gather 
information from others about an object’s value. Hall [4] 
also suggests experts who know the value of the item will 
not bid until the end of the auction in order not to reveal 
the value and raise the price. This strategy is similar to 
the strategy of opportunists proposed by Bapna et al. [2]. 
Figure 1 illustrates the theoretical model of this study. 
Independent-private-value and asymmetries of 
information are two important assumptions of many 
auction theories [12]. For auctions of newly 
manufactured goods, Common external referenced price 
on the posted-price market will influence both the 
strategy and the behavior of bidders. Based on the 
classification of Bapna et al. [2], we propose that the 
bidding behaviors for secondhand products will be 
different with bidding behaviors for newly manufactured 
ones, and we conducted a field to verify the differences 
 
3. Research Context 
We got more than one hundred auction sites using 
two Chinese search engines. However, as mentioned by 
Lucking-Reiley [11], most of these auction sites were 
relatively small. This result reflects the network 
externality effects of auctions [6]. The site Go2HK 
(www.go2hk.com) was selected as the sample among the 
auction sites being searched for several reasons. First, 
comparing with other auction sites been searched, there 
were more buyers and products being sold on this site, so 
auctions on the site would be more likely to be efficient. 
Second, the site followed the rule of English auction, 
which is the most popular mechanism on Internet 
auctions. Third, both secondhand and newly 
manufactured items were sold on Go2HK, hence this site 
satisfied the requirements of our study. Fourth, auctions 
on this site were open-book ones, details of the auctions 
such as the buyer, price, and time of each bid were 
provided, and so behaviors of the bidders can be 
observed.  
Lucking-Reiley [11] has surveyed types of items at 
auction on Internet and finds that the collectibles and the 
electronics and computers were the two most popular 
ones. Although collectibles was the largest category, 
transactions of electronics and computers were selected 
as the subjects of this study because electronics and 
computers were more standardized product. For the same 
reason, the study focused only on transactions of 
notebook computer and mobile phone. 
Go2HK followed the rule of English auction. English 
ascending-bid auctions are by far the most prevalent on 
the Internet. On Internet English auction, bidders can 
search the items they are interested, view the current high 
bid, and decide whether to raise the bid price. In order to 
ensure the efficiencies, mark up of the bid must bigger 
than the minimum acceptable increment set in advance. 
The process will continue to the end of the bidding period. 
The last bidder, who will pay the highest price, is going 
to win the auction. Go2HK also provided the service of 
proxy bidding. A bidder with a high willingness to pay 
need not check back at the site repeatedly to keep raising 
the bid as necessary. Using proxy bidding, it will be no 
differences when the bidders propose their rules, the 
bidder with the highest upper limit price will always win 
the bid, and the price he pay will equal to the price of the 
next highest upper limit price add on the minimum 
acceptable increment. From the perspective of auction 
theory, results of proxy bidding are similar to the 
sealed-bid, second-price Vickrey auction [10]. 
Data are collected from the auction site Go2HK. 
Although there were many items been sold on this 
auction site, most of them got few responses. Because the 
interactions among bidders should affects bidding 
behavior, only the bidding records of the auctions with 
more than ten bids were collected. 41 auction items that 
terminate in the data collecting period and satisfied the 
criteria of bids number and were got. There were totally 




Type of goods 
new vs. secondhand 
Figure 1. Theoretical model 
 
 
1449 bids in the 41 auctions. Table 1 and table 2 show 
the components of the auction items and bidding records 
collected in the sample.  
 








7 6 13 
Secondhand items 12 16 28 
Total 19 22 41 
 








223 239 462 
Secondhand items 340 647 987 
Total 563 886 1449 
 
4. Analysis 
Bidding Strategies of evaluators are different with the 
strategies of participators. Evaluators know clearly their 
true valuation of the good and submit high bids at the 
early stages of the auction. On the other hand, 
Participators are bidders who follow the bidding closely 
and place ascending bids. So in English auction, 
participators will bid on the mark up equal to the 
minimum acceptable increment, and evaluators may bid 
on the mark up larger than the minimum increment. 
Comparing with the auctions of secondhand items, 
because there are the referenced external market prices 
for the newly manufactured items, bidders can more 
easily evaluate the true value of the item and are more 
likely to become evaluators. So there will be more bids 
which on the mark up larger than the minimum increment 
for the auctions of newly manufactured items.  
Existence of evaluators is discussible. Even if bidders 
may know the value of the item been auctioned, they will 
avoid to reveal their valuation and try to get the item on 
the price as low as possible [4]. Especially by using 
proxy bidding, bidders can easily bid incrementally and 
try not to reveal their highest prices. Although there are 
external market prices of newly manufactured items, 
bidders will behave like participators and bidding 
behaviors of newly manufactured items will not be 
different with that of secondhand ones. 
 
Table 3. Percentage of bids on mark up larger 





Newly manufactured items 19.91% 25.75% 
Secondhand items 24.09% 17.12% 
 
Table 3 presents the percentage of bids on mark up 
larger than minimum acceptable increment for each type 
of items. The table shows that, first, about one fifth to 
one fourth bidding bided on mark up larger than the 
minimum acceptable increment, there were really some 
bidders behaved like evaluators. And second, percentages 
of bids that on mark up larger than the minimum 
increment on secondhand items were not different with 
that on newly manufactured items. The results indicate 
that there is really someone who will behave like an 
evaluator on Internet auction, and whether a bidder will 
be an evaluator or a participator is more likely to be 
affected by some factors of personal characteristics, but 
not the factors such as common referenced external 
market price. 
Although the external market price would not affect 
whether the bidders will be evaluator or participator, it is 
still interesting whether the external market price could 
make any impact on bidders’ behavior. If there are not 
any effects at all, the reason could be that the market 
price is not an efficient one. Except for comparing the 
percentages of bids of which on the mark up larger than 
the minimum increment, average mark up are also 
compared in the study. Because for different items, the 
price levels were not the same, mark up is normalized by 
divided by the minimum acceptable increment. Formula 
of normalizing mark up is as follow: 
qi ＝Pi－Pi-1 / Pmin,     ( 1 ) 
qi :  normalized mark up for the i bid, 
Pmin : minimum acceptable increment, 
Pi :  price for the i bid.  
 
Table 4. Averaged normalized mark up for 
mobile phone 




Average 25.072 2.264 
Variance 15219.156 14.969 
N 223 340 
t statistics 3.4081 




Table 5. Averaged normalized mark up for 
notebook computer 




Average 50.992 2.588 
Variance 53796.41 935.655 
N 239 647 
t statistics 5.1923 
p（two tails） 2.5786E-07 ＜α＝0.1 
 
Averaged normalized mark up prices for new 
manufactured and secondhand items is compared by t test 
separately for mobile phone and notebook computer on 
table 4 and table 5. The results indicate averaged 
normalized mark up of newly manufactured items were 
significantly larger than that of secondhand items, both 
for mobile phone and for notebook computer. Although 
external referenced price may not affect whether a bidder 
will be an evaluator or a participator, affected by the 
prices on posted-price markets as common referenced 
value, evaluators for the newly manufactured items will 
bid on a higher mark up than evaluators for the 
secondhand items.  
 
5. Conclusion 
We conducted a field study on Internet to investigate 
the differences between the bidding behavior for 
secondhand and newly manufactured goods. Data is 
collected on an open-book auction site that lists all the 
bidding history on web. Results of the analyses show that, 
first, there were really some bidders behaved like 
evaluators. Second, percentages of bids that on mark up 
larger than the minimum increment on secondhand items 
were not different with that on newly manufactured items. 
Whether a bidder will be an evaluator or a participator is 
more likely to be affected by some factors of personal 
characteristics, but not the factors such as common 
referenced external market price. Third, averaged 
normalized mark up of newly manufactured items were 
significantly larger than that of secondhand items, 
common external referenced price may affect bidders’ 
behaviors. 
This study try to investigate what types of goods will 
be auctioned on the Internet by comparing bidding 
behaviors of newly manufactured goods and that of 
secondhand ones. Results of the study suggest the prices 
on posted-price market will not affect bidder's strategy 
but could still affect bids on the auction market. Because 
bidders do refer to the posted-price, the problem why 
newly manufactured products are sold by auctions 
remains to be further investigated. Winner’s curse of the 
auctions may be one of the reasons [15]. Except for the 
bidding price, bidding time is also an important decision 
variable in auctions. Experts and opportunists will not bid 
until the last minute of the bidding [2] [4]. The last 
minute effect has been well-known phenomenon on 
Internet auctions [17]. Bidding time should be further 
combined with bidding price to model and compare the 
bidding behaviors of various types of goods. 
This study verified bidders’ strategies as evaluators 
and participators. However, it is still curious why bidders 
will be an evaluator that raise the prices substantially and 
reveal their valuations of the items, and why bidders as a 
participator will bid in the early stage of the bidding. 
Many works needed to be done in the future. 
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